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In the last decade the female quota issue has 
become a relevant topic and raised attention all over 
the world, and especially in the European area, due 
to the introduction of specific laws on female quota 
in many countries. Policymakers in European 
countries have recently begun to increase presence 
of women in business by adopting gender quota for 
board of directors. The European Union collectively, 
and more than a dozen countries individually, have 
considered these requirements; the first country 
adopting a law demanding for a minimum amount 
of female directors in the board was Norway (40%), 
in 2003. After Norway, other countries such as Spain 
(2007), Finland (2010), France (2011), Denmark 
(2005), Iceland (2010), Malaysia (2011), and others 
introduced some kind of compulsory quota. 
Alongside the European regulatory framework, 
literature has started to investigate the effects of 
female quotas on several firm aspects, like corporate 
governance quality, firm performance, gendering 
representation, disentangling discrimination, and 
earnings quality (Dale-Olsen, Schone and Verner, 
2013; De Cabo, Gimeno and Escot, 2011; Rose, 2007; 
Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011; Ahern and Dittmar, 
2012). 
In 2011, also in Italy a law on female quota was 
introduced (law 120/2011), imposing to listed firms 
to have at least one-third of the board seats held by 
women. A transition period consisting in three-
board-terms is given to firms to be in compliance 
with the law. In the first-board-term it is allowed to 
have one-fifth of the board seats held by females. 
The provision has started to be in force since August 
2012. Before this enactment, some studies focused 
on the board diversity issues, such as ethnicity, age, 
directors with multiple seats, board independence, 
and gender, mentioned also the Italian scenario (Van 
der Walt and Ingley, 2003; Bohren and Strom, 2010).  
Since the enactment of the mandatory gender quota 
in Italy, only the study of Bianco et al. (2015) has 
focused on this turnaround in Italy. Using a sample 
composed by publicly traded firms from 2008 to 
2010, the authors show that family-affiliated women 
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the state of art of 
female directors in terms of presence, role and remuneration for 
Italian corporate boards. The analysis wants to highlight the 
changes occurred after the introduction of the mandatory female 
quotas legislation in 2012 and to check how many firms are 
already complying with the law after 2 years. The picture of the 
state of art is drawn looking at 163 Italian listed firms for a period 
of 4 years, from 2011 to 2014. The analysis of the data reveals 
relevant differences in board composition before and after the 
law. A significant result concerning the presence of female 
directors stands in the difference between family and non-family 
firms: the first are those with higher number of female members 
in the board. Additionally, an interesting data refers to the 
amount of remuneration for women, which is significantly lower 
than the remuneration provided to male directors. Being the first 
work which charts the situation of board composition and board 
member remuneration in Italy before and after female quotas 
introduction, this paper wants to trace some key points for future 
analysis about the impact of female quotas on various firm’s 
aspects, such as firm performance, firm earning management and 
quality, governance characteristics. 
 
Keywords: Female Quota, Board Composition, Women Directors, 
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size, concentrated ownership, consumer sector 
belonging, and large boards. On the contrary, non-
family affiliated women are more common in the 
boards of firms that are widely held, present 
younger and more educated directors, have a higher 
portion of independent directors and a smaller 
number of interlocked directors. Although this 
research offers interesting insights on gender quota 
literature, it is based on data collected before the 
female quota law’s implementation in Italy and its 
immediate period. The authors themselves suggest 
in their conclusion to explore the picture related to 
female representation on boards of directors after 
the law is applied.  
The purpose of this work is to map the 
situation of Italian boards composition from 2011 
until the end of 2014, to provide firstly data on the 
level of female presence on boards before 2012 and 
then, to check whether and how listed firms are 
complied with the law requirements or are still 
delinquent, looking also at the role of female 
directors on boards. More specifically, the authors 
investigate on the following research questions: do 
listed firms are fasting moving to meet the 
minimum required female quota? Which are the 
characteristics of the firms actually more compliant 
with the law? Is there any difference between family 
and non-family firms?  
In addition to that, a further analysis has been 
conducted on the directors’ remuneration to 
highlight possible dissimilarities, in order to answer 
to an additional interesting research question: is 
there any disparity in the amount level received by 
male and female directors?  
The sample includes 163 Italian listed firms for 
a period of 4 years (2011-2014). Banks, financial and 
insurance institutions were not taken into account 
due to their differences in terms of governance, 
organizational and managerial aspects.  
Descriptive statistics reveal that, first, at the 
time of the introduction of the female quota law in 
Italy, the amount of women on boards was very low 
(less than 10%). Then, the state of art of female 
quota on boards of listed firms after the 
introduction of the law has substantially changed. 
The presence of female directors increased as 
expected due to the effect of the female quota law.  
The interesting insight relies on the fact that results 
show a higher female directors’ presence in family 
firms than in non-family firms. Nevertheless, a very 
small amount of firms (12%) is already compliance 
with the law at the end of 2014, with at least 33% of 
board seats held by women. Finally, the study 
provides some findings on compensation differences 
between female and male directors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: in 
the next section an overview of the literature on 
female quotas is provided; then, the sample and the 
data analyzed are described; after descriptive 
statistics and results are provided and commented; 
finally discussion and conclusions are given. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON FEMALE QUOTA 
 
Despite substantial female progress in the last 
century and European regulation on female quota on 
boards of directors, business leadership remains 
largely male dominated. The investigation of the 
effect of the gender diversity on board of directors 
over the past two decades has increased and covered 
several aspects of this topic.  
A former path of literature has focused on 
gender diversity on board of directors, analyzing, 
first, if and how different genders are represented 
on corporate boards, and then how gender diversity 
has impacted on boards. Among these studies, some 
researchers focus their attention on the female 
presence on boards, seeking to understand the 
representation and the impact of women in senior 
leadership positions in organizations (Terjesen, 
Sealy and Singh, 2009; Burke, 1997; Burgess and 
Tharenou, 2002; Bear, Rahman and Post 2010; 
Torchia, Calabro and Huse, 2011; Huse, Nielsen and 
Hagen, 2009; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Grosvold, 
Brammer and Rayton 2007; Brammer, Millington and 
Pavelin, 2007, 2009; Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 
2003; Erhardt, Werbell and Shrader, 2003). Although, 
these studies do not refer to any regulatory 
framework, due to the absence of specific laws on 
mandatory female quota, at that time. Recently, the 
introduction of mandatory female quota in several 
countries has generated a new stream of literature 
studying the effects of this turnaround on firms. 
As mentioned, the pioneer country in adopting 
female mandatory quota was Norway. As a 
consequence, several studies on this topic have been 
conducted on Norwegian context. Wang and Kelan 
(2013), using a sample of Norwegian listed firms, 
investigate on whether the gender quota requiring 
40% female directors on corporate boards affects the 
likelihood of women being designated as board 
chairs or corporate CEOs. They find that the 
presence of female chairs is positively related to 
female directors’ independence status, age and 
qualification, whereas the presence of female CEOs 
is positively associated with the average 
qualification of female directors, pointing out that 
likelihood for women to be nominated as board 
chairs increases when older and better educated. 
Still acting within the Norwegian context, some 
scholars focus on the impact of gender quota for 
corporate board seats on corporate policy decision 
(Mats and Miller, 2012) while some other evaluate 
the impact of increased gender diversity on firm 
performance (Dale-Olsen, Schone and Verner, 2013; 
Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Rose, 2007).  
Beside the Norwegian context, literature about 
women on boards has focused on several aspects 
and consequences for firms. Some authors, 
analyzing independent directors, find that female 
directors are much more often independent 
directors than man are and that compared with male 
directors, female directors are more likely to be 
outsiders (Bohren and Staubo, 2016; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009).  De Cabo et al. (2011) provide 
evidence of discrimination behind the scare 
presence of women on Spanish boards of directors. 
The authors also point out a positive relationship 
between the number of female directors sitting 
already on the board and the probability of adding 
other female directors. 
Some scholars provide evidence of changing in 
gender composition boards and demographic 
differences between directors appointed before and 
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after the introduction of the female quota law. They 
demonstrate that women directors are different 
from men in terms of age, gaining appointments to 
large board and international diversity (Singh, Point 
and Moulin, 2015). Focusing on corporate 
governance aspects, literature suggests that women 
on boards and on committees ensure a higher 
diligence in controlling, transparency and disclosure 
providing in this way a better quality of earnings 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul, Srinidhi and Ng, 
2010; Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011). 
Kougut et al. (2014), with their empirical study 
on American boards, highlight that the size of the 
minimal quota to have an equilibrium will depend 
on specific features of the social networks and the 
rules by which directors are elected, showing also 
that smaller quota provide well connected networks 
of female directors. Following this path, 
Zaichkowsky (2014) challenges the theory of the 
“critical mass” of three or more women sitting in the 
board to make a difference. Specifically, the author 
finds positive relation between the number of 
female directors and corporate governance 
effectiveness. 
The topic has also been addressed in several 
empirical researches with reference to the 
relationship between board female quota and firm 
performance. Some of them demonstrate a positive 
relationship between the presence of female 
directors on the board and accounting measures of 
performance (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Anderson, 
Reeb, Upadhyay and Zhao, 2011), whilst others find 
negative relationship (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Matsa and Miller, 2012) or they do not identify 
statistically significant results (Adams, Gray and 
Nowland, 2010).  
It seems evident that female quota issue has 
been explored with reference to different firm 
aspects and in several countries. Nevertheless, in 
Italy, to our knowledge, no empirical studies have 
been conducted on the matter, yet. Thus, we 
propose an initial analysis of the Italian context 
aiming to start filling the gap on the impact of the 
Italian female quota law on board composition. 
 
3. SAMPLE AND DATA  
 
The sample is composed by Italian listed firms and 
their directors during the period 2011-2014, 
excluding financial services, banks and insurance 
firms1. The final sample consists of an unbalanced 
panel of 6.448 director-level observations from 163 
firms. The data on board composition, firm 
ownership structure and industry (“Super Sector” 
classification – 17 industries are taken into  
account – provided by Borsa Italiana) are taken from 
Borsa Italiana, Consob, and Osiris databases. 
Additional data on directors’ characteristics, role, 
and remuneration are hand-collected looking at the 
firms’ published reports on corporate governance 
and directors remuneration2. 
                                                          
1 The exclusion of the financial services, banks and insurance firms is due to 
the relevant differences in regulation and corporate governance systems 
and, above all, to avoid problems associated with different policies and 
controls mechanisms. 
2 Required by the art.123-ter of Testo Unico della Finanza. 
Aligned with existing literature (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006, Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999), we consider as family 
firms those with an ultimate owner, a single 
individual or a family, holding at minimum 20%. 
As far as remuneration is concerned, we sum 
all the monetary proceeds (fixed and variable) 
received indistinctly by both female and male 
directors, as declared in the Remuneration Report, 
required by the Italian regulation. 
Below, a table presenting the variables 
(Table 1). 
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1. Board size and independent directors 
 
To introduce the analysis, we start providing 
descriptive statistics on the general characteristics 
of Italian boards. Looking at Table 2, results show 
that the average number of directors on Italian 
boards is around 9. The media and the median are 
aligned also with the international literature 
suggesting the optimal board size for an efficient 
corporate governance (Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993; Yermach, 1996; Magnanelli, 2012). It 
appears interesting to highlight the following 
evidence shown by data: until 2013 this number 
remains constant and it slightly increases in 2014, 
from 9 to 10.  
Concerning the independence of the directors, 
according to the Italian regulation3 the minimum 
required for Italian listed firms is 1 independent 
director within a board with no more than 7 
members, 2 within a larger board. As far as the 
analysis is concerned, the number of independent 
directors4 on the board remains constant over the 4 
years. As showed in Table 2, the average amount of 
independent directors is 4.5, which means more or 
less 50% of board members, according to the 
founded average. These results suggest that Italian 
listed firms are more than compliance with the law 
on independent directors.  
Taking into account the characteristics of 
Italian firms, mainly held by families and in most of 
the cases also run by the family members (Bianco, 
Ciavarella and Signoretti , 2015; Bercredi, Bozzi and 
Di Noia, 2013), we provide a deeper analysis of 
board characteristics, focusing on  family and non-
family firms. The board size remains unchanged, 
whilst there is a slight difference in terms of number 
of independent directors, presenting a median equal 
to 4 for family firms and 5 for non-family firms. 
                                                          
3 Art. 147-ter, comma 3 of Testo Unico della Finanza. 
4 A director is defined as “independent” (also sometimes known as an outside 
director) if she is related or affiliated to another member of the board or of 
the top management, or in case she has a material or pecuniary relationship 
with the company or a related persons. 
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Table 1. Description of the variables 
 
Name Description 
board size Number of board members 
num_independent Number of independent directors 
% independent directors on the board Percentage of independent directors on the board 
D_female_dir Dummy variable, equal to 1 if at least one member of the board is female, 0 otherwise 
num_female_dir Number of female directors on the board 
%female_dir Percentage of female directors on the board 
%>33female_dir_DUMMY 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the percentage of female directors on the board is higher 
than 33%, 0 otherwise 
female_ceo Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the CEO is a women, 0 otherwise 
female_pres_vicepres 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the president or the vice-president of the board is a 
women, 0 otherwise 
femaledirectors_remuneration Total amount of monetary proceeds given to female directors 
maledirectors_remuneration Total amount of monetary proceeds given to female directors 
This table provides a description of the variables analyzed in this paper 
 
Table 2. Italian board features 
 
Whole sample descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis  
2011 2012 2013 2014 
board size           
total number of directors 6448 1544 1601 1637 1666 
media  9,87 9,59 9,88 9,92 10,10 
median 9 9 9 9 10 
num_independent           
media  4,50 4,57 4,40 4,48 4,54 
median 4 4 4 4 4 
% independent directors on the board           
media  0,47 0,49 0,46 0,46 0,46 
median 0,43 0,45 0,43 0,43 0,43 
Family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis  
2011 2012 2013 2014 
board size           
total number of directors 3997 948 981 1021 1043 
media  9,47 9,12 9,34 9,54 9,93 
median 9 9 9 9 10 
num_independent           
media  4,16 4,27 4,09 4,09 4,00 
median 4 4 4 4 4 
% independent directors on the board           
media  0,45 0,48 0,45 0,44 0,43 
median 0,42 0,44 0,40 0,40 4,00 
Non-family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
board size 
     
total number of directors 2451 596 620 616 619 
media  10,61 10,46 10,88 10,62 10,49 
median 10 9 10 9 10 
num_independent 
     
media  5,12 5,12 4,98 5,19 5,17 
median 5 5 5 5 5 
% independent directors on the board 
     
media  0,51 0,52 0,49 0,52 0,51 
median 0,50 0,50 0,44 0,51 0,50 
This table provides the descriptive statistics on the main board features analysed in this study (board size and 
independent directors) 
 
4.2. Female representation on Italian boards  
and compliance with mandatory regulation  
 
Analyzing data concerning the presence of women 
on boards, as shown in Table 3, results highlight 
how the presence of women on boards increases 
over time, year by year, raising from a total amount 
of 122 female directors in 2010 to 327 in 2014, 
almost 3 times the initial amount. The media and 
the median of this variable (num_female_dir) are 
aligned, showing 1 woman in the board until 2013 
and 2 at the end of 2014. It is interesting to look 
also at the variable D_female_dir, which counts the 
number of firms having at least 1 female member in 
their board. Also this number increases over the 
four years, from 87 up to 127 firms in 2014. This 
result provides evidence that listed firms had very 
few women on their boards before 2012 and that 
have started to introduce females in the boards to 
be in compliance with the law, from 2013 onwards. 
Bearing in mind the minimum mandatory quota 
(33%), we point out that only 12% of the listed firms 
already meet the law requirements in 2014. 
Considering that before the introduction of law only 
2% of firms presented a female quota on board 
higher that 33%, results show the first effects of the 
law.
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Table 3. Female representation on Italian boards and compliance with mandatory regulation 
 
Whole sample descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
D_female_dir 
     
count 472 87 106 132 147 
number of observations 653 161 162 165 165 
% firms with female directors 0,72 0,54 0,65 0,80 0,89 
num_female_dir 
     
count 868 122 164 255 327 
media  1,33 0,76 1,01 1,55 1,98 
median 1 1 1 1 2 
%female_dir 
     
media  0,14 0,08 0,10 0,16 0,20 
median 0,13 0,07 0,10 0,17 0,20 
%>33female_dir_DUMMY 
     
count 35 3 4 8 20 
number of observations 653 161 162 165 165 
% firms with >33% 0,05 0,02 0,02 0,05 0,12 
Family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
D_female_dir 
     
count 309 56 70 89 93 
number of observations 422 104 105 107 106 
% firms with female directors 0,73 0,54 0,67 0,83 0,88 
num_female_dir 
     
count 543 77 105 164 196 
media  1,29 0,74 1,00 1,53 1,87 
median 1 1 1 2 2 
%female_dir 
     
media  0,13 0,08 0,11 0,16 0,19 
median 0,14 0,07 0,11 0,17 0,20 
%>33female_dir_DUMMY 
     
count 18 3 3 4 8 
number of observations 422 104 105 107 106 
% firms with >33% 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,08 
Non-family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
D_female_dir 
     
count 163 31 36 43 53 
number of observations 231 58 57 58 59 
% firms with female directors 0,71 0,53 0,63 0,74 0,90 
num_female_dir 
     
count 325 45 59 91 130 
media  1,41 0,79 1,04 1,57 2,20 
median 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 
%female_dir 
     
media  0,13 0,08 0,09 0,15 0,21 
median 0,13 0,06 0,09 0,13 0,20 
%>33female_dir_DUMMY 
     
count 17 0 1 4 12 
number of observations 231 58 57 58 59 
% firms with >33% 0,07 0,00 0,02 0,07 0,20 
This table provides the descriptive statistics on female directors representation on Italian boards and firms' 
compliance with gender quota regulation 
 
Analyzing the sample focusing on family and 
non-family firms, it is interesting to notice that 56 
firms (out of 87) having at least 1 female on the 
board in 2011 were family. From the family firms 
perspective, 53% of them already had female 
directors without an active law on female quota. 
During the following years, this percentage 
increases, reaching 88% at the end of 2014. In terms 
of number of women, it increases over the years, 
from 77 in 2011 up to 196 in 2014. In 2014, family 
firms with female directors in their boards reached a 
female quota equal to 20%. 
Moreover, 7, 55 % of all family firms are already 
complying with the regulation, having at least 33% of 
women sitting in their boards. 
As far as non-family firms are concerned, it 
seems interesting to underline the percentage of 
firms already compliance with the law in 2014, 
which is 20%, much higher than the one shown by 
family firms (7, 55%). Furthermore, what comes up is 
the trend of the %>33%female_dir_DUMMY (in terms 
of percentage) variable, expressing the compliance 
with the law. For family firms it increases constantly 
over the 4 years, while for non-family firms it bumps 
from 0 in 2011 up to 20% in 2014 (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Board gender composition trend from 2011 to 2014 
  
4.3. Female directors’ role on Italian boards 
 
Concerning the role of women on boards, the data 
illustrated in Table 4 show that on average for the 
whole sample the percentage of firms having a 
female CEO is 7%. Specifically in 2011, 10 firms over 
a total sample of 161 firms have a female CEO. 
Going deeply into the analysis, we observe that 9 
firms out of 10 having a female CEO are family 
firms. The percentage remains pretty much 
unchanged over the 4 years of observation. 
Also looking at firms having female president 
or vice-president, it is evident that the percentage of 
firms in which females have such roles is very low 
(around 13%). In 2011, 16 out of 18 firms presenting 
a female president or vice-president are family 
firms. Also this proportion remains almost 
unchanged over the 4 years of observation. 
 
Table 4. Female directors role on Italian boards 
 
Whole sample descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
female_ceo 
     
count 44 10 11 12 11 
number of observations 653 161 162 165 165 
% 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,07 
female_pres_vicepres 
     
count 87 18 22 21 26 
number of observations 653 161 162 165 165 
% 0,13 0,11 0,14 0,13 0,16 
Family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
female_ceo 
     
count 39 9 10 10 10 
number of observations 422 104 105 107 106 
% 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 
female_pres_vicepres 
     
count 74 16 20 19 19 
number of observations 422 104 105 107 106 
% 0,18 0,15 0,19 0,18 0,18 
Non-family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
female_ceo 
     
count 5 1 1 2 1 
number of observations 231 58 57 58 59 
% 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 
female_pres_vicepres 
     
count 13 2 2 2 7 
number of observations 231 58 57 58 59 
% 0,06 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,12 
This table provides the descriptive statistics on female directors' roles on Italian boards 
 
4.4. Male and female directors remuneration on 
Italian boards 
 
As reported in Table 5, descriptive statistics on 
directors’ remuneration evidence that the average 
remuneration for female directors (Euros 94.396) is 
much lower compared to the male directors 
remuneration (Euros 207.486), which is almost the 
double. Moreover, focusing on the trend on the 
remuneration, during the 4 years observation, it is 







2011 2012 2013 2014
% firms with >33% - FAMILY
% firms with >33% - NON FAMILY
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remuneration decreases over time while the male 
media remuneration slightly increases. 
Going deeper in the analysis, focusing on 
family and non-family firms it is evident that the 
media remuneration for both female and male 
directors is higher for family firms than for non-
family firms. It is necessary to outline that the media 
remuneration numbers include also CEOs, president 
and vice-president compensations (see Figure 2). To 
conclude we underline that the pattern of a lower 
remuneration for female directors than male one 
remains also in family firms.  
 
Figure 2. Female and male directors' remuneration analysis 
 
 
Table 5. Male and female directors remuneration on Italian boards 
 
Whole sample descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
femaledirectors_remunaration 
     
numbers of female directors 868 122 164 255 327 
total female remuneration € 81 936 028 € 12 863 706 € 17 522 122 € 23 105 409 € 28 444 791 
media female remuneration € 94 396 € 105 440 € 106 842 € 90 609 € 86 987 
maledirectors_remuneration 
     
numbers of male directors 5580 1422 1437 1382 1339 
total male remuneration € 1 157 774 540 € 285 049 174 € 299 564 284 € 289 984 236 € 283 176 846 
media male remuneration € 207 486 € 200 457 € 208 465 € 209 829 € 211 484 
Family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
femaledirectors_remunaration 
     
numbers of female directors 543 77 105 164 196 
total female remuneration € 64 997 931 € 10 582 175 € 14 827 337 € 19 036 118 € 20 798 846 
media female remuneration € 119 702 € 137 431 € 141 213 € 116 074 € 106 117 
maledirectors_remuneration 
     
numbers of male directors 3454 871 876 857 847 
total male remuneration € 794 004 957 € 196 316 360 € 202 632 746 € 198 302 903 € 199 308 106 
media male remuneration € 229 880 € 225 392 € 231 316 € 231 392 € 235 311 
Non-family firms descriptive statistics 
Variables whole sample 
Years Analysis 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
femaledirectors_remunaration 
     
numbers of female directors 325 45 59 91 130 
total female remuneration € 16 559 180 € 2 281 531 € 2 694 785 € 4 069 290 € 7 637 945 
media female remuneration € 50 951 € 50 701 € 45 674 € 44 717 € 58 753 
maledirectors_remuneration 
     
numbers of male directors 2126 551 561 525 489 
total male remuneration € 356 376 285 € 88 732 814 € 96 931 538 € 91 681 333 € 83 453 701 
media male remuneration € 167 628 € 161 040 € 172 783 € 174 631 € 170 662 
This table provides descriptive statistics on female and male directors' remuneration on Italian boards 
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4.5. Industry analysis 
 
Data are analyzed also comparing different 
industries, to see whether relevant differences 
emerge. Focusing on board size, the industries Basic 
Resources, Construction, Materials and Real Estate 
show the highest number of board members 
(median equal to 13, 13, and 12 respectively), while 
the Retail industry has the lowest one (median equal 
to 7). 
Looking at independent directors sitting on 
boards, the Construction and Materials industry as 
well as the Utilities industry present a median of 
independent directors (60%) above the average of all 
other industries (as mentioned before around 45%). 
Instead, the lowest percentage of independent board 
members is detained by the Retail sector, with an 
average of 33% over the 4 years of observation. 
As far as the female directors analysis is 
concerned, it is interesting to look at the data 
reported for the Basic Resources industry. That 
sector is characterized by the presence of at least 1 
woman on the board, also before the introduction of 
female quota regulation. At the same time we 
highlight that beside the presence of women before 
the introduction of the law, at the end of 2014 the 
full compliance with the law is not achieved yet. 
Looking at the Chemical industry, even though 
before 2012 the presence of women was not so 
strong (%female_dir equal to 4, 17%), post female 
quota introduction not only all firms had at least 1 
woman on the boards, but they are also fully 
complied with the law. At the end of 2014, 
Chemicals is the only industry presenting all firms 
having a female representation on boards higher 
that the required 33%. From this point of view, 
another interesting industry is Construction and 
Materials, which presents a very high percentage of 
firms with women on boards, before and after the 
female quota introduction (61% and 89% 
respectively), even if at the end of 2014, none of the 
firms has a percentage of female directors higher 
than 33%. 
The results on Oil and Gas and Automobiles 
and Parts industries appear relevant. They show the 
lowest amount of women on boards for all the 4 
years of observation. Particularly, the data highlight 
that in these sectors started introducing female 
directors upon the regulation and, despite it, the 
engagement of women on boards it is still moderate. 
As proof of this fact, at the end of 2014 only a small 
percentage of firms are complied with the law (10% 
for Oil and Gas and 12, 5% for Automobiles and 
Parts).  
The limited involvement of the women on 
boards is also confirmed by almost all other 
industries. Firms belonging to Financial Service, 
Telecommunication, Health Care, and Travel and 
Leisure industries, even if present female directors 
in their boards, at the end of 2014, they are not 
complied with the regulation, meaning that none of 
them has more than 33% female quota. Firms 
belonging to Financial Service, Health Care and 
Utilities industries are better responding to the law, 
showing a higher percentage of women on boards at 
the end of 2014 (21%, 24% and 20% respectively). 
Notably, the Utility industry presents almost the 22% 
firms already fully complied with the law. 
Taking a look at data on female CEO, it is 
evident that the average amount of firms having a 
female CEO is very low, if not absent as it occurs in 
many industries. The highest percentage is shown by 
the industries Personal and Household Goods (14%), 
Media (38%) and Food and Beverage (11%). It seems 
relevant to highlight that these results remain pretty 
much stable after the female quota regulation. The 
engagement of female as president or vice-president 
is relatively quite higher than the female 
involvement as CEO for all industries. It is 
interesting to point out that all sectors having a high 
presence of female CEOs do present also high 
presence female president and/or vice-president 
(28% for Personal and Household Goods, 24% for 
Media and 18% for Food and Beverage) in all years of 
observation. Moreover, we notice that Basic 
Resources industry presents all firms with a female 
covering at least one of these two roles. On the 
contrary, Real Estate, Technology and 
Telecommunication, industries are those in which 
there are no women covering these roles in any year 
of observation. 
Finally, as previously mentioned, also the 
industry analysis reveals that average female 
remuneration is significantly lower than male 
remuneration. The only exception is given by the 
Basic Resources industry, for which the female 
remuneration (Euros 539.785) is higher than the 
male one (Euros 144.114). This result has to be read 
together with the information previously provided: 
in this industry all firms have a female president 
and/or vice-president, who gets usually a much 
higher remuneration than other directors.  
Among all sectors we highlight that only the 
Media one shows a remuneration level for women 
almost aligned with male directors, during the whole 
observation period. 
For our analysis it comes up that on average 
only the 20-25% of the overall cost of the board is 
due to female directors remuneration, while the 80-
75% is absorbed by male remuneration. Viewing this 
fact from another perspective, women present on 
average a remuneration that is equal to 35-40% of 
the amount given to men, with the exception of the 
Media and Basic Resources industries for the 
reasons previously explained. 
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Table 6. Industry analysis (Part 1) 
 
  Basic 
resorces 

































total number of  
directors 
50 26 24 67 30 37 148 74 74 433 204 229 61 33 28 244 124 120 
media  12,50 13,00 12,00 8,38 7,50 9,25 9,25 9,25 9,25 12,03 11,33 12,72 7,63 8,25 7,00 8,71 8,86 8,57 
median 13,00 13,00 12,00 8,00 7,00 9,50 9,50 9,00 9,50 13,00 13,00 13,00 9,00 9,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 8,00 
num_independent 
                  
media  4,00 3,00 5,00 3,75 3,00 4,50 3,63 3,75 3,50 6,14 6,33 5,94 3,63 3,75 3,50 3,93 4,00 3,86 
median 4,00 3,00 5,00 3,00 3,00 4,50 3,50 3,50 3,50 4,00 4,50 4,00 4,00 4,00 3,50 4,00 4,00 4,00 
% independent directors on the board 
media  0,33 0,23 0,42 0,47 0,45 0,48 0,38 0,40 0,37 0,52 0,58 0,47 0,50 0,47 0,52 0,46 0,46 0,46 
median 0,31 3,00 0,42 0,46 0,43 0,50 0,39 0,40 0,39 0,60 0,64 0,40 0,44 0,44 0,52 0,45 0,40 0,53 
D_female_dir 
count 4 2 2 5 1 4 7 3 4 27 11 16 8 4 4 27 13 14 
number of 
observations 
4 2 2 8 4 4 16 8 8 36 18 18 8 4 4 28 14 14 
% firms with female 
directors 
100% 100% 100% 62,50% 25% 100% 43,75% 37,50% 50% 75% 61,11% 88,89% 100% 100% 100% 96,43% 92,86% 100% 
num_female_dir 
count 4 2 2 15 2 13 14 5 9 50 17 33 11 6 5 42 15 27 
media  1 1 1 1,875 0,5 3,25 0,88 0,63 1,13 1,39 0,94 1,83 1,38 1,50 1,25 1,50 1,07 1,93 
median 1 1 1 2 0 3,5 0 0 0,5 1 1 2 1,5 1,5 1,5 1 1 2 
%female_dir 
media  8,04% 7,69% 8,39% 19,58% 4,17% 35% 8,67% 5,98% 11,35% 10,79% 7,62% 13,95% 17,08% 18,06% 16,11% 18,00% 13,56% 22,44% 
median 8% 7,69% 8,39% 25% 0% 33,33% 0% 0% 7,14% 9,31% 7,42% 14,36% 21,11% 19,44% 21,11% 17,42% 14,29% 20% 
%>33female_dir_DUMMY 
count 0 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
number of 
observations 
4 2 2 8 4 4 16 8 8 36 18 18 8 4 4 28 14 14 
% firms with >33% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 100% 6,25% 0% 12,50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7,14% 0,00% 14,29% 
female_ceo 
count 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 
number of 
observations 
4 2 2 8 4 4 16 8 8 36 18 18 8 4 4 28 14 14 
% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10,71% 7,14% 14,29% 
female_pres_vicepres 
count 4 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 4 
number of 
observations 
4 2 2 8 4 4 16 8 8 36 18 18 8 4 4 28 14 14 
% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 18,75% 12,50% 25% 5,56% 0% 11,11% 0% 0% 0% 17,86% 7,14% 28,57% 
femaledirectors_remunaration 
number of female 
directors 
4 2 2 15 2 13 14 5 9 50 17 33 11 6 5 42 15 27 
total female 
remuneration 
€2159141 €913681 €1245460 €508669 €35333 €473336 €1170060 €399712 €770348 €3536184 €887705 €2648479 €149273 €63273 €86000 €5403915 €2176757 €3227158 
media female 
remuneration 
€539785 €456841 €622730 €33911 €17667 €36410 €83576 €79942 €85594 €70724 €52218 €80257 €13570 €10546 €17200 €128665 €145117 €119524 
maledirectors_remuneration 
number of male 
directors 
46 24 22 52 28 24 134 69 65 383 187 196 50 27 23 202 109 93 
total male 
remuneration 
€6629247 €7313463 €5481750 €11458794 €16795570 €6122019 €34007117 €16801245 €17205872 €118057220 €52929253 €65127967 €1881164 €956588 €924576 €40939103 €22529599 €18409504 
media male 
remuneration 
€144114 €304728 €249170 €220361 €599842 €255084 €253784 €243496 €264706 €308243 €283044 €332286 €37623 €35429 €40199 €202669 €206694 €197952 
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total number of  
directors 
216 91 125 1254 609 645 582 283 299 209 108 101 707 343 364 345 172 173 
media  9,00 7,58 10,42 9,50 9,23 9,77 11,64 11,79 11,50 10,45 10,80 10,10 8,32 8,37 8,27 12,32 12,29 12,36 
median 9,00 8,00 10,00 9,00 9,00 10,00 11,00 11,00 11,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 8,00 8,00 8,00 12,00 10,50 12,00 
num_independent 
                  
media  4,08 3,92 4,25 4,51 4,52 4,50 3,96 3,79 4,12 5,05 5,00 5,10 3,68 3,73 3,64 4,68 4,71 4,64 
median 3,00 3,00 10,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 3,50 4,00 5,00 5,00 5,50 3,00 3,00 3,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 
       
% independent directors on the board 
       
media  0,50 0,55 0,44 0,48 0,50 0,47 0,36 0,35 0,37 0,52 0,51 0,53 0,45 0,45 0,46 0,36 0,36 0,35 
median 0,54 0,63 0,42 0,45 0,50 0,43 0,36 0,38 0,36 0,55 0,47 0,55 0,40 0,43 0,40 0,41 0,37 0,42 
D_female_dir 
                  
count 12 3 9 93 40 53 44 19 25 8 3 5 64 26 38 19 8 11 
number of 
observations 
24 12 12 132 66 66 50 24 26 20 10 10 85 41 44 28 14 14 
% firms with 
female directors 
50% 25% 75% 70,45% 60,61% 80,30% 88% 79,17% 96,15% 40% 30% 50% 75,29% 63,41% 86,36% 67,86% 57,14% 78,57% 
        
num_female_dir 
        
count 26 4 22 159 55 104 86 32 54 13 3 10 110 38 72 47 34 34 
media  1,08 0,33 1,83 1,20 0,83 1,58 1,72 1,33 2,08 0,65 0,30 1,00 1,29 0,93 1,64 1,68 2,43 2,43 
median 0,5 0 2 1 1 1 2 1,5 2 0 0 0,5 1 1 2 1 2 2 
%female_dir 
                  
media  11,13% 5,16% 17,10% 12,32% 9,22% 15,43% 15,42% 12,19% 18,41% 6,18% 2,21% 10,14% 16,05% 11,84% 19,97% 13,12% 19,04% 19,04% 
median 3,57% 0% 23,61% 10,56% 9,09% 15,48% 14,84% 12,50% 18,18% 0% 0% 4,17% 16,67% 11,11% 21,11% 14,29% 17,16% 17,16% 
        
%>33female_dir_DUMMY 
        
count 0 0 0 4 1 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 5 2 3 2 2 2 
number of 
observations 
24 12 12 132 66 66 50 24 26 20 10 10 85 41 44 28 14 14 
% firms with >33% 0% 0% 0% 3,03% 1,52% 4,55% 4% 4,17% 3,85% 5% 0% 10% 5,88% 4,88% 6,82% 7,14% 14,29% 14,29% 
female_ceo 
                  
count 0 0 0 4 2 2 19 9 10 0 0 0 12 6 6 1 1 1 
number of 
observations 
24 12 12 132 66 66 50 24 26 20 10 10 85 41 44 28 14 14 
% 0% 0% 0% 3,03% 3,03% 3,03% 38% 37,50% 38,46% 0% 0% 0% 14,12% 14,63% 13,64% 3,57% 7,14% 7,14% 
        
female_pres_vicepres 
        
count 4 2 2 20 10 2 12 6 6 1 0 1 24 12 12 0 0 0 
number of 
observations 
24 12 12 132 66 66 50 24 26 20 10 10 85 41 44 28 14 14 
% 16,67% 16,67% 16,67% 15,15% 15,15% 3,03% 24% 25% 23,08% 5% 0% 10% 28,24% 29,27% 27,27% 0% 0% 0% 
        
femaledirectors_remunaration 
        
number of female 
directors 
26 4 22 159 55 104 86 32 54 13 3 10 110 38 72 47 34 34 
total female 
remuneration 
€2091909 €745279 €1346630 €12328501 €4661985 €7666516 €19053541 €8647895 €10405646 €1696866 €619666 €1077200 €15782606 €5164645 €10617961 €987942 €208814 €779128 
media female 
remuneration 
€80458 €186320 €61210 €77538 €84763 €73717 €221553 €270247 €192697 €130528 €206555 €107720 €143478 €135912 €147472 €21020 €6142 €22916 
        
maledirectors_remuneration 
        
number of male 
directors 
190 87 103 1095 554 541 496 251 245 196 105 91 597 305 292 298 138 139 
total male 
remuneration 
€30210603 €13244468 €16966135 €190571192 €98049444 €92521749 €115767786 €57384765 €58383021 €88358596 €49937930 €38420666 €160061592 €80246937 €79814655 €29635606 €15829347 €13806259 
media male 
remuneration 
€159003 €152235 €164720 €174 038 €176985 €171020 €233403 €228625 €238298 €450809 €475599 €422205 €268110 €263105 €273338 €99448 €114705 €99326 
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total number of  directors 159 85 74 589 286 303 98 44 54 208 102 106 693 350 343 
media  7,95 8,50 7,40 8,66 8,41 8,91 12,25 11,00 13,50 10,40 10,20 10,60 10,83 10,94 10,72 
median 7,00 7,50 7,00 8,50 8,00 9,00 10,00 12,50 12,50 9,00 9,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 
num_independent 
               
media  3,05 3,30 2,80 3,99 3,82 4,15 6,00 6,00 6,00 4,65 4,30 5,00 6,47 6,50 6,44 
median 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,50 3,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 4,50 4,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 
% independent directors on the board 
media  0,40 0,41 0,39 0,47 0,48 0,47 0,48 0,53 0,42 0,47 0,47 0,46 0,59 0,58 0,60 
median 0,33 0,35 0,33 0,43 0,43 0,44 0,39 0,47 0,39 0,44 0,44 0,46 0,60 0,60 0,60 
D_female_dir 
count 18 8 10 47 20 27 8 4 4 10 2 8 48 19 29 
number of observations 20 10 10 68 34 34 8 4 4 20 10 10 64 32 32 
% firms with female 
directors 
90% 80% 100% 69,12% 58,82% 79,4% 100% 100% 100% 50% 20% 80% 75% 59,38% 90,63% 
num_female_dir 
count 25 10 15 86 33 53 12 4 8 21 3 18 99 27 72 
media  1,25 1,00 1,50 1,26 0,97 1,56 1,50 1,00 2,00 1,05 0,30 1,80 1,55 0,84 2,25 
median 1 1 1,5 1 1 1,5 1 1 1 1 0 1,5 1 1 2 
%female_dir 
               
media  16,16% 11,72% 20,60% 13,64% 10,97% 16,31% 11,41% 9,44% 13,37% 10,27% 3,97% 16,58% 14,48% 7,02% 21,94% 
median 15,48% 11,81% 20,83% 14,29% 10,56% 16,67% 10,56% 10% 11,11% 11,11% 0% 17,14% 11,11% 7,50% 20% 
%>33female_dir_DUMMY 
count 1 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 7 
number of observations 20 10 10 68 34 34 8 4 4 20 10 10 64 32 32 
% firms with >33% 5% 0% 10% 4,41% 5,88% 2,94% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10,94% 0% 21,88% 
female_ceo 
count 0 0 0 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
number of observations 20 10 10 68 34 34 8 4 4 20 10 10 64 32 32 
% 0% 0% 0% 7,35% 8,82% 5,88% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
female_pres_vicepres 
               
count 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 5 2 3 
number of observations 20 10 10 68 34 34 8 4 4 20 10 10 64 32 32 
% 20% 20% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 20% 0% 7,81% 6,25% 9,38% 
femaledirectors_remunaration 
number of female 
directors 
25 10 15 86 33 53 12 4 8 21 3 18 99 27 72 
total female remuneration 904603,8 €384572 €520032 €6476376 €3189592 €3286784 €1483553 €471546 €1012007 €1036587 €283330 €753257 €5397399 €1063071 €4334328 
media female 
remuneration 
36184,152 €38457 €34669 €75307 €96654 €62015 €123629 €117887 €126501 €49361 €94443 €41848 €54519 €39373 €60199 
maledirectors_remuneration 
number of male directors 134 75 59 503 253 250 86 40 46 187 99 88 594 323 271 
total male remuneration €12035417 €6467358 €5568059 €87841017 €45010008 €42831009 €22577266 €11097158 €11480108 €30692898 €16909086 €13783812 €112806473 €55390637 €57415836 
media male remuneration €89817 €86231 €94374 €174634 €177905 €171324 €262526 €277429 €249568 €164133 €170799 €156634 €189910 €171488 €211867 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Before the introduction of the gender quota law for 
listed firms women’s representation on Italian 
boards was very low – 6,7%, as already pointed out 
also by Bianco et al. (2015) – both in terms of firms 
having women directors and in terms of number of 
females sitting in their boards. 
Overall, we notice that after one year from the 
study of the mentioned authors the female presence 
on Italian boards continues to increase, aligned with 
the law requirements. However, the most relevant 
evidence emerging from our descriptive statistics 
relies on the fact that firms completely or nearly 
compliance with the law, at the end of 2014, are 
mostly non-family firms. This result suggests that 
family firms, being less market-oriented than non-
family ones, are unwilling to fulfill law compliance 
in the short-term if not mandatory (firms have three-
board terms to meet the law’s requirements). 
Strengthening this conclusion, we highlighted that 
for non-family firms the female presence increases 
are drastic, bumping from 0 to 20% during the four 
years of observation. Considering this result, a 
question arises: beside the law, non-family firms are 
introducing women on their board, looking for 
validate candidates, because they rely on a positive 
women contribution to board’s outcomes and they 
want to enhance the firm’s performance, or they just 
try to beat market consensus through compliance? 
Previous literature in countries in which the gender 
quota law is active since many years has 
demonstrated that the introduction of women on 
boards is linked with a drop in firm’s performance 
(Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa e Miller, 2013). 
Having said that, further researches might focus on 
the relationship between female presence on Italian 
boards and firms performance that, to our 
knowledge, it is still an uninvestigated issue in the 
Italian context. 
Consistently with previous discussion, our 
descriptive statistics disclose a little aptitude of 
Italian listed firms to engage women for top 
management role (CEO, President and Vice-
President). Nevertheless, family firms appoint more 
likely women for these roles than non-family firms 
do. In our opinion, this evidence suggests that in 
family firms family ties do count for corporate 
governance key figures, in order to ensure the family 
supervision on the key roles for running the 
business. 
It is therefore interesting to describe the 
picture emerging from the remuneration data: the 
male directors remuneration results higher than the 
female one, but looking more in depth at these data 
we find another remarkable difference between 
family and non-family firms. Despite family firms 
are usually characterized by small size, they 
recognize higher remuneration to board members 
than non-family ones. The counterintuitive result is 
actually aligned with the “private benefit of control” 
approach (Pacces, 2008; Tiscini and Raoli, 2013), 
acting within the family firms’ literature. 
As far as the board size is concerned, our 
outcomes highlight that the average number of 
board members slightly rises in 2014, from 9 to 10, 
showing a tendency to enlarge the size of the board. 
Bearing in mind the recent financial crisis affecting 
the global securities markets and the optimal size of 
the board suggested by previous literature, this 
evidence seems to be counterintuitive. Thus, it 
would be interesting to investigate in future 
researches whether this increase is due to the female 
quota law introduction or not.  
It is evident that since the introduction of the 
female quota law in 2012, the opportunities for 
women to be appointed as directors have grown also 
in Italy. We have to take into account a particularity 
of the Italian female quota law: the provision has 
started to be in force since August 2012, but its 
effectiveness will end in 2022. The policy makers 
idea is that by that time, women will have shown 
their competences, their skills and their positive 
performance, thus, no laws will be further needed to 
have them in the boards because they will be kept 
thanks to their capabilities. Further studies could 
focus on the effects of the end of the law and could 
analyze what will happen in terms of board 
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